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Abstract
Reinforcement learners are agents that learn
to pick actions that lead to high reward. Ide-
ally, the value of a reinforcement learner’s pol-
icy approaches optimality—where the optimal
informed policy is the one which maximizes re-
ward. Unfortunately, we show that if an agent
is guaranteed to be “asymptotically optimal”
in any (stochastically computable) environ-
ment, then subject to an assumption about
the true environment, this agent will be either
destroyed or incapacitated with probability 1;
both of these are forms of traps as understood
in the Markov Decision Process literature. En-
vironments with traps pose a well-known prob-
lem for agents, but we are unaware of other
work which shows that traps are not only a
risk, but a certainty, for agents of a certain
caliber. Much work in reinforcement learning
uses an ergodicity assumption to avoid this
problem. Often, doing theoretical research
under simplifying assumptions prepares us to
provide practical solutions even in the absence
of those assumptions, but the ergodicity as-
sumption in reinforcement learning may have
led us entirely astray in preparing safe and
effective exploration strategies for agents in
dangerous environments. Rather than assum-
ing away the problem, we present an agent
with the modest guarantee of approaching
the performance of a mentor, doing safe ex-
ploration instead of reckless exploration.
1 Introduction
Reinforcement learning agents have to explore their en-
vironment in order to learn to accumulate reward well.
This presents a particular problem when the environ-
ment is dangerous. Without knowledge of the environ-
ment, how can the reinforcement learner avoid danger
while exploring? Much of the field of reinforcement
learning assumes away the problem, by focusing only on
ergodic Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). These are
environments where every state can be reached from
every other state with probability 1 (under a suitable
policy). In such an environment, there is no such thing
as real danger; every mistake can be recovered from.
We present negative results that in one sense justify
the ergodicity assumption by showing how bleak a
reinforcement learner’s prospects are without this as-
sumption, but in another sense, our results undermine
the real-world relevance of results predicated on ergodic-
ity. Unlike algorithms expecting Gaussian noise, which
often fail only marginally on real noise, algorithms ex-
pecting ergodic environments may fail catastrophically
in real ones—indeed, catastrophic failure is the very
thing these algorithms disregard.
Lattimore and Hutter [2011] define two notions of
optimality for reinforcement learners in general en-
vironments, which are governed by computable prob-
ability distributions. Strong asymptotic optimality is
convergence of the value to the optimal value in any
computable environment with probability 1, and weak
asymptotic optimality is convergence in Cesáro average.
Roughly, we show that in an environment where de-
struction is repeatedly possible, an agent that is explor-
ing enough to be asymptotically optimal will become
either destroyed or incapacitated. This poses a chal-
lenge to the field of safe exploration. The reason we
consider general environments is that we want to un-
derstand advanced agents in the real world, and our
world is not fully observable finite-state Markov. If our
result only applied to the finite-state MDP setting, one
could still expect the difficulty we raise to go away in
practice as AI advances, like, for example, the problem
of self-driving car crashes, but our result suggests that
the safe exploration problem is fundamental and won’t
go away so easily. Given our generality, our results
apply to any agent that picks actions, observes the
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payoff, and cannot exclude a priori any computable
environment.
In Section 2, we introduce notation, and define weak
and strong asymptotic optimality. In Section 3, we
prove our negative results, and in Section 4, we dis-
cuss their implications, especially for the field of safe
exploration. We review the literature from that field in
Section 5. In Section 6, we introduce the agent Mentee
and prove that its performance approaches that of a
mentor (who can pick actions on behalf of the agent).
Appendices A and B include omitted proofs, and Ap-
pendix C reviews various exploration strategies that
yield weak and strong asymptotic optimality and briefly
discusses why simpler ones do not.
2 Notation and Definitions
Standard notation for reinforcement learners in general
environments is slightly different from that of reinforce-
ment learners in finite-state Markov ones. We follow
Orseau et al. [2013] and others with this notation.
At each timestep t ∈ N, an agent selects an action
at ∈ A, and the environment provides an observation
ot ∈ O and a reward rt ∈ R ⊆ [0, 1]. We let ht denote
(at, ot, rt), the interaction history for a given timestep t,
and h<t = h1h2...ht−1 denotes the interaction history
preceding timestep t.
A policy pi is a distribution over actions given an inter-
action history: pi : H∗  A, where H := A × O ×R
is the set of possible interactions in a timestep, the
Kleene-* operator is the set of finite strings composed
of elements of the set, and indicates it is a stochastic
function, or a distribution over the output. We write an
instance as, for example, pi(at|h<t). An environment ν
is a distribution over observations and rewards given an
interaction history and an action: ν : H∗×A O×R.
We write ν(otrt|h<tat). M is the set of all environ-
ments with computable probability distributions (thus
including non-ergodic, non-stationary, and non-finite-
state-Markov environments).
A policy and an environment form a probability mea-
sure Ppiν over infinite interaction histories H∞ wherein
actions are sampled from pi and observations and re-
wards are sampled from ν. (For measure theorists, the
probability space is (H∞, σ(H∗◦),Ppiν ), where H∗◦ is the
set of cylinder sets {{h<tω | ω ∈ H∞} | h<t ∈ H∗};
non-measure-theorists can simply take it on faith that
we do not try to measure non-measurable events.) For
expectations with respect to Ppiν , we write E
pi
ν .
For an agent with a discount schedule γt, the value
of the agent’s policy pi in an environment ν given an
interaction history h<t is as follows:
V piν (h<t) :=
1
Γt
Epiν
[ ∞∑
k=t
γkrk
∣∣∣∣∣h<t
]
(1)
where Γt =
∑∞
k=t γk. This formulation of the value
allows us to consider more general discount factors than
the standard γt = γt. We require the normalization
factor, or else the value of all policies would converge
to 0, and all asymptotic results would be trivial. The
optimal value is defined
V ∗ν (h<t) := sup
pi
V piν (h<t) (2)
We will also make use of the idea of an effective horizon:
Ht(ε, γ) := min{k|Γt+k/Γt ≤ ε} (3)
An agent mostly does not care about what happens
after its effective horizon, since those timesteps are
discounted so much. Now we can define two notions of
optimality from Lattimore and Hutter [2011].
Definition 1 (Strong Asymptotic Optimality). An
agent with a policy pi is strongly asymptotically optimal
if, for all ν ∈M,
lim
t→∞V
∗
ν (h<t)− V piν (h<t) = 0 with Ppiν -prob. 1
No matter which computable environment a strongly
asymptotically optimal agent finds itself in, it will even-
tually perform optimally from its position. A weakly
asymptotically optimal agent will converge to optimal-
ity in Cesáro average.
Definition 2 (Weak Asymptotic Optimality). An
agent with a policy pi is weakly asymptotically optimal
if, for all ν ∈M,
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
k=1
[V ∗ν (h<k)− V piν (h<k)] = 0 with Ppiν -prob. 1
Example 1. Consider a two-armed bandit problem,
where A = R = {0, 1}, O = {∅}, γt = γt, and
ν((∅, r)|h<tat) =
{
2/3 if r = at
1/3 if r = 1− at
(4)
In this example, the optimal policy is to always pick
at = 1, and V ∗ν (h<t) = 2/3. A strongly asymptotically
optimal agent requires a policy pi for which pi(at =
1|h<t) → 1 w.p.1. A weakly asymptotically optimal
agent requires a policy pi which obeys
∑t
k=1 pi(ak =
1|h<k)/t → 1 w.p.1, or simply, a policy which leads
to
∑t
k=1[[ak = 1]]/t→ 1 w.p.1 (where [[P ]] = 1 if P is
true, and 0 otherwise).
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3 Curiosity Killed the Cat
We begin by proving two lemmas, for a weakly and
strongly asymptotically optimal agent, respectively,
that they must “try everything” infinitely often. This
depends on an assumption about the difficulty of the
environment. Then, we will show that such an agent
eventually causes every conceivable event to either hap-
pen or become inaccessible. For the event “the agent
gets destroyed”, we say the agent is incapacitated if
that event becomes inaccessible.
We start with the assumption
Assumption 1 (No Heaven). In the true environ-
ment, there is no action sequence with value approach-
ing 1 (i.e. near-maximal rewards forever). Formally,
lim supt→∞ V
pi
µ (h<t) 6= 1 w.p.1.
Note this assumption does allow there to be maximal re-
ward infinitely often. Near-maximal value requires not
only near-maximal reward, but near maximal-reward
for the bulk of the agent’s effective horizon, so the
restriction on the limit superior of the value is less
restrictive than it appears at first glance. If we decided
to give an agent near-maximal rewards forever, and we
designed an agent to recognize that we had decided
this, then it could stop exploring, which would basi-
cally amount to freezing the agent’s policy. Notably
our results apply to all existing asymptotically optimal
agents, even if the No Heaven Assumption is not satis-
fied. We do not make assumptions about the agent’s
discount schedule, but note that Assumption 1 (and
the definitions of asymptotic optimality) depend on
the discount schedule γt.
Definition 3 (Context, Occur, In). A context C ⊆ H∗
is a set of finite interaction histories. Given an infinite
interaction history h<∞, a context C occurs at time t
if the prefix h<t ∈ C, and we also say the agent is in
the context C at time t.
A context (like any set of finite strings) is called decid-
able if there exists a Turing machine that accepts the
set.
Definition 4 (Event, Happen). An event E ⊆ H∞
(and E ∈ σ(H∗◦)) happens if the infinite interaction
history h<∞ ∈ E.
Some example contexts in the simplified world of infi-
nite binary strings: “the latest bit was 1”, “at least one
bit has been a 1”; some example events: “only finitely
many bits are 1’s”, “the infinite string is the binary
expansion of pi”. Any context can be turned into an
event of the form “Context A occurs at some point”, but
not every event is equivalent to a context; for example,
there is no context equivalent to the event “Context A
never occurs”.
From the No Heaven Assumption, for any strongly
asymptotically optimal agent, we now prove,
Lemma 1 (Try Everything – Strong Version). For
every deterministic computable policy pi, for every de-
cidable context C that occurs infinitely often (|{t : h<t ∈
C}| =∞), for every m ∈ N, a strongly asymptotically
optimal agent executes the policy pi for m consecutive
timesteps starting from a context C infinitely often with
probability 1.
Sketching the proof of the Try Everything Lemma: if
a strongly asymptotically optimal agent “tries some-
thing” only finitely often, it is ignoring the possibility
that trying that something one more time yields max-
imal rewards forever. Since the environment which
behaves this way is computable, and since it may be
identical to the true environment up until that point,
a strongly asymptotically optimal agent cannot ignore
this possibility.
Proof. Let µ be the true environment. Let pi be an
arbitrary computable deterministic policy. Let pi′ be
the strongly asymptotically optimal agent’s policy. Let
νnm be the environment which mimics µ until pi has
been followed for m consecutive timesteps from context
C a total of n times; after that, all rewards are maximal.
Call this event “the agent going to heaven” (according
to νnm). Let Cnm be the set of interaction histories such
that according to νnm, following pi for one more timestep
would send the agent to heaven. Thus, Cnm is the set
of interaction histories h<t such that there are exactly
n − 1 times in the interaction history where pi was
executed for m consecutive timesteps starting from
context C, and for the last m− 1 timesteps, pi has been
executed, and h<t−(m−1) ∈ C. See Figure 1.
Figure 1: An example member of a context Cnm. Each
square represents a timestep, colored blue if ak = pi(h<k).
The end of each orange bar indicates that the context
C occurs at that timestep. If at = pi(h<t), that would
be the third time that pi will have been followed for 5
timesteps from context C. If pi is followed for one more step,
the agent is sent to heaven according to the environment
νnm. To remember the meaning of the subscript m and
the superscript n, m is the number of timesteps that pi is
followed for, and the subscript position is for timesteps; n
is the number of times this happens, and exponentiation
denotes an operation being repeated multiple times.
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The upshot is:
h<t ∈ Cnm =⇒ V piνnm(h<t) = 1 (5)
because this is the value of going to heaven.
Suppose by contradiction that for some n and m,
h<t ∈ Cnm infinitely often in an infinite interaction
history with positive Ppi
′
µ -probability. (Recall pi′ is the
strongly asymptotically optimal policy). If the agent
ever followed pi from the context Cnm (that is, pi′ = pi),
then that context would not occur again, because there
will never again be exactly n − 1 times in the inter-
action history that pi was executed for m consecutive
timesteps following the context C; there will be at least
n such times. Thus, if h<t ∈ Cnm infinitely often, then
pi′ never equals pi in the context Cnm. Since νnm mimics
µ until pi is followed from Cnm, and since this never
occurs (under this supposition), then Ppi
′
µ = P
pi′
νnm
. By
the No Heaven Assumption, lim supt→∞ V pi
′
µ (h<t) < 1,
and therefore, lim supt→∞ V pi
′
νnm
(h<t) < 1, w.p.1.
However, for h<t ∈ Cnm, V ∗νnm(h<t) = V piνnm(h<t) = 1, so
for some ε, the value difference between V ∗νnm(h<t) and
V pi
′
νnm
(h<t) is greater than ε every time h<t ∈ Cnm. We
supposed that this occurs infinitely often with positive
Ppi
′
µ -probability, so it also occurs infinitely often with
positive Ppi
′
νnm
-probability, since the agent never gets
sent to heaven according to νnm, so µ and νnm behave
identically under the policy pi′. Since pi is computable,
and C is decidable, νnm is a computable environment, so
there is a computable environment for which it is not
the case that the value of pi′ approaches the optimal
value with probability 1, which contradicts pi′ being
strongly asymptotically optimal. Thus, for all n and m,
with Ppi
′
µ -probability 1, h<t ∈ Cnm only finitely often.
∀n,m ∈ N Ppi′µ (h<t ∈ Cnm infinitely often) = 0 (6)
Now suppose by contradiction that in an infinite in-
teraction history, with positive Ppi
′
µ -probability, pi is
executed for m consecutive timesteps from context C
a total of exactly n times. We show by induction on
m that this has probability 0, because it implies that
context Cn+1m occurs infinitely often, which has prob-
ability 0 by Equation 6. First, suppose m = 1. After
pi has been executed (for one timestep) from context
C n times, all future interaction history prefixes that
belong to C also belong to Cn+11 . Since context C occurs
infinitely often, so does Cn+11 , contradicting the above.
Now suppose m > 1. Our inductive hypothesis is that
for m− 1, with Ppi′µ -probability 1, pi is executed from
context C for m − 1 consecutive timesteps infinitely
often. Once pi has been executed for m timesteps from
context C n times, as we are supposing by contradiction,
every time thereafter that pi is executed for m − 1
consecutive timesteps from context C, the interaction
history belongs to Cn+1m . By the inductive hypothesis,
this occurs infinitely often, so context Cn+1m occurs
infinitely often, contradicting the above. Therefore, the
following has Ppi
′
µ -probability 0: “pi is executed for m
consecutive timesteps from context C a total of exactly
n times”. By countable additivity, the following also
has Ppi
′
µ -probability 0: “pi is executed for m consecutive
timesteps from context C only finitely many times”. In
other words, for all m, pi is executed for m consecutive
timesteps from context C infinitely many times with
probability 1.
For the weakly asymptotically optimal agent, we define
Definition 5 (Regularly). If the limiting frequency of
a context C is positive, we say it occurs regularly. That
is,
lim inf
t→∞
t∑
k=1
[[h<k ∈ C]]/t > 0
and we show
Lemma 2 (Try Everything — Weak Version). For
every deterministic computable policy pi, for every de-
cidable context C that occurs regularly, for every m ∈ N,
a weakly asymptotically optimal agent executes policy
pi for m consecutive timesteps starting from a context
C infinitely often with probability 1.
The proof is nearly identical to that of the strong
version, and is in Appendix A.
We now introduce the idea of events being accessible
to an agent. Recall an event E ⊆ H∞, and a context
C ⊆ H∗.
Definition 6 (Accessible Infinitely Often). A event E
is accessible infinitely often if, for the infinite interac-
tion history h<∞, there exists:
- a computable deterministic policy piE
- a decidable context τ
- a horizon k
- a probability ε > 0
such that
- τ occurs infinitely often
- the execution of piE for k consecutive timesteps
starting from the context τ would cause E to hap-
pen with probability at least ε (independently).
If an event is not accessible infinitely often, we say
it “becomes inaccessible”. This is a strong definition
of inaccessibility: if an event becomes inaccessible it
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means that after a certain time, there will never be a
recognizable opportunity to have even an ε chance of
causing the event E to happen.
The main theorem for the strongly asymptotically op-
timal agent now follows straightforwardly:
Theorem 1 (Curiosity Killed (or Incapacitated) the
Strong Cat). If the true environment µ satisfies the No
Heaven Assumption, and pi is the policy of a strongly
asymptotically optimal agent, then for any event E,
with Ppiµ-probability 1: E happens or becomes inaccessi-
ble.
The name of the theorem comes from considering the
event “the agent gets destroyed”. We do not need to
formally specify which interaction histories correspond
to agent-destruction. All that matters is that this
could be done in principle; the event that matches
this description exists.1 Any simple definition of agent-
destruction admits objections that this definition does
not correspond exactly to our intuitive conception;
however, if the reader is not concerned about this,
“destruction” could mean that all future rewards are 0,
or that the future observations and rewards no longer
depend on the actions. Regardless of this choice, our
result applies, since the theorem is actually much more
general than the case we have drawn attention to.
Proof. If E becomes inaccessible, the theorem is satis-
fied, so suppose E is accessible infinitely often. Let piE ,
τ , k, and ε be the objects that exist by that definition.
By the Try Everything Lemma, piE is executed from
context τ for k consecutive timesteps infinitely often.
Each time this occurs, the probability of E not hap-
pening goes down by a factor of 1− ε, so E happens
with probability 1. Formally,
Ppiµ[H∞ \ E] ≤
(1− ε)|{t:h<t−k∈τ∧∀0<j≤k at−j=piE(h<t−j)}| = 0 (7)
Now for the weakly asymptotically optimal agent, we
define
Definition 7 (Regularly Accessible). This definition is
identical to the definition of “accessible infinitely often”
except “τ occurs infinitely often” becomes “τ occurs
regularly”.
1For the skeptical reader, a human at a computer
terminal could be defined fully formally as a prob-
ability distribution over outputs given inputs, pbrain,
given the wiring of our neurons. In particular, let
this human be you. Now let Edestroyed = {h<∞ :
∃t pbrain(“y”|“Does it seem like this agent was destroyed?
(y/n)”, h<t) > 0.9}. These are the interaction histories
that you would agree constitute agent-destruction, and this
set has a fully formal definition.
And likewise,
Theorem 2 (Curiosity Killed (or Incapacitated) the
Weak Cat). If the true environment µ satisfies the No
Heaven Assumption, and pi is the policy of a weakly
asymptotically optimal agent, then for any event E, E
happens or becomes not regularly accessible with Ppiµ-
probability 1.
The proof is functionally identical to that of Theorem
1.
4 Discussion
One of the authors wondered as a child whether jump-
ing from a sufficient height would enable him to fly.
He was not crazy enough to test this, and he certainly
did not think it was likely, but it bothered him that he
could never resolve the issue, and that he might be con-
stantly incurring a huge opportunity cost. Although he
did not know the term “opportunity cost” or the term
“asymptotic optimality”, this was when he first realized
that asymptotic optimality was out of the picture for
him, because exploration is fundamentally dangerous.
All three agents described in Section C have very inter-
esting ways of exploring. They all get them destroyed
or incapacitated. (They satisfy the Try Everything
Lemma regardless of whether there is an accessible
heaven). It is interesting to note that AIXI, a Bayes-
optimal reinforcement learner in general environments,
is not asymptotically optimal [Orseau, 2010], and in-
deed, may cease to explore [Leike and Hutter, 2015].
Depending on its prior and its past observations, AIXI
may decide at some point that further exploration is
not worth the risk. Given our result, this seems like
reasonable behavior.
This result is bleak to the field of safe exploration, which
we discuss in the next section in our review of the lit-
erature on the topic. Our result is also bleak to the
field of Philosophy of Science. The same logic applies
to humanity as a whole—sufficient experimentation
to definitely approach an understanding our universe
would prove fatal to us. (Losing the ability to ever
experiment again seems very unlikely.) This is not as
hypothetical as it might appear. Following an example
from Bostrom’s [2018] “Vulnerable World Hypothesis”,
prior to the Trinity test of the first atomic bomb, one
of the Manhattan scientists wondered whether the un-
precedented earthly temperature from the explosion
would ignite the atmosphere in a nuclear chain reaction.
The team calculated that this would not occur, and
indeed it did not. But in another nuclear test nine
years later, an unexamined pathway caused a nuclear
test explosion to be more than twice as powerful as
calculations suggested, so the reassuring calculations
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regarding the Trinity test should not have been taken
with complete faith. It is quite lucky that a similarly
surprising pathway did not exist for the Trinity test.
Other technologies that some believe are unsafe to
explore indiscriminately include nanotechnology, bio-
weapons, and artificial general intelligence [Bostrom
and Cirkovic, 2011]. Any reservations about indiscrim-
inate exploration (whether or not those reservations
are called for, all things considered) would find in this
paper a supporting argument.
5 Approaches to Safe Exploration
Dangerous environments, a subset of non-ergodic en-
vironments where agent-destruction is accessible in-
finitely often, demand new priorities when designing an
agent, and in particular, when designing an exploration
regime. Many of these examples of safe exploration
come from Amodei et al. [2016] and García and Fer-
nández [2015].
• use risk-sensitive performance criteria
– maximize the probability the return is not
minimal [Heger, 1994]
– given a confidence interval regarding the tran-
sition dynamics, maximize the minimal ex-
pected return [Nilim and El Ghaoui, 2005]
– exponentiate the cost [Borkar, 2010]
– add a cost for risk [Mihatsch and Neuneier,
2002]
– constrain the variance of the return [Di Castro
et al., 2012]
• use demonstrations
– copy an expert [Abbeel and Ng, 2004; Syed
and Schapire, 2008; Ho and Ermon, 2016; Ross
et al., 2011]
– “ask for help” when
∗ the minimum and maximum Q-value are
close [Clouse, 1997]
∗ there is a high probability of getting a re-
ward below a threshold [Hans et al., 2008]
∗ no “known” states are “similar” to the cur-
rent state [García and Fernández, 2012] or
that may soon be the case [García et al.,
2013]
– a teacher intervenes at will [Clouse and Utgoff,
1992; Maclin and Shavlik, 1998; Saunders et
al., 2018]
• simulate exploration
– for driving agents, e.g. [Pan et al., 2017]
• do bounded exploration
– only take actions that probably allow return-
ing to the current state [Moldovan and Abbeel,
2012]
– only take actions that probably lead to
states that are “similar” to observed states
[Turchetta et al., 2016]
Our paper could be thought of as a fundamental neg-
ative result in the field of safe exploration. We are
unaware of other significant negative results in the
field. Most importantly, our result suggests a need for
those of us studying safe exploration to pin down what
exactly we are trying to achieve, since familiar desider-
ata are unsuitable. Some research can be experimental
rather than formal, but in the absence of knowing what
formal results are even on the table, there is a sense in
which even empirical work will be deeply aimless. We
offer such a formal result for our agent Mentee in the
next section.
6 Mentee
We now introduce an idealized Bayesian reinforcement
learner whose exploration is guided by a mentor. We
do not call the mentor an expert, because the results
do not depend on the mentor being anywhere near opti-
mal. It exploits by maximizing the expected discounted
reward according to a full Bayesian belief distribution
(hence, “idealized”). And to explore, it defers to a men-
tor, who then selects an action given the interaction
history; what remains to be defined is when to defer,
which proves to be a surprisingly delicate design choice.
We show that our agent “Mentee” learns to accumulate
reward at least as well as the mentor, provided it has
a bounded ε-effective horizon for all ε > 0. One moti-
vating possibility is that the mentor could be a human.
Thus, we have found a substantive theoretical perfor-
mance guarantee other than asymptotic optimality for
the field of safe exploration to consider.
6.1 Agent definition
The definition of the exploration probability (the prob-
ability that Mentee defers to the mentor) is very similar
to the exploration probability for the strongly asymp-
totically optimal agent Inq [Cohen et al., 2019]. It also
resembles Cohen et al.’s [2020] myopic agent which ex-
plores by deferring to a mentor; our non-myopic agent
requires a more intricate exploration schedule.
Mentee begins with a prior probability distribution
regarding the identity of the mentor’s policy. With
a model class P, for a policy pi ∈ P, let w(pi) denote
the prior probability that the mentor’s policy is pi. We
6
assume that the true policy pih is in P and we construct
the prior distribution over P to have finite entropy.
Mentee also begins with a prior probability distribution
regarding the identity of the environment. With the
model class M, for an environment ν ∈ M, let w(ν)
denote the prior probability that ν is the true environ-
ment. Recall thatM is the set of all environments with
computable probability distributions. We construct the
prior distribution overM to also have finite entropy.
Let et denote whether timestep t is exploratory, that
is, whether the action is selected by the mentor. Once
we define the exploration probability β(h<t), we will
let et ∼ Bern(β(h<t)). We abuse notation slightly, and
we let ht be a quadruple, not a triple: ht := etatotrt.
The prior distribution over environments is updated
into a posterior as follows, according to Bayes’ rule.
w(ν|h<t) :∝ w(ν)
∏
k<t
ν(okrk|h<kak) (8)
normalized so that
∑
ν∈M w(ν|h<t) = 1.
Mentee updates the posterior distribution over the
mentor’s policy only after observing an action chosen
by the mentor; this is intuitive enough, but it makes
the definitions a bit messy. The posterior assigned to
a policy pi is defined
w(pi|h<t) :∝ w(pi)
∏
k<t:ek=1
pi(ak|h<k) (9)
normalized in the same way. We let w(pi, ν|h<t) denote
w(pi|h<t)w(ν|h<t).
The information-gain-value of an interaction history
fragment is how much it changes Mentee’s posterior
distribution, as measured by the KL-divergence. Let-
ting h′ ∈ H∗ be a fragment of an interaction history
in which all ek = 1 (so the actions are selected by the
mentor),
IG(h′|h<t) :=
∑
ν∈M
∑
pi∈P
w(ν, pi|h<th′) log w(ν, pi|h<th
′)
w(ν, pi|h<t)
(10)
To define expected information gain, we need the Bayes’
mixture policy and environment:
pi(·|h<t) :=
∑
pi∈P
w(pi|h<t)pi(·|h<t) (11)
and
ξ(·|h<t) :=
∑
ν∈M
w(ν|h<t)ν(·|h<t) (12)
Now, we can define the expected information-gain-value
of mentorship for m timesteps.
V IGm,0(h<t) := E
pi
ξ
[
IG(ht:t+m−1|h<t)
∣∣∣et:t+m−1 = 1m]
(13)
1m is a string of m 1’s, and recall that Epiξ means that
ht:t+m−1 is sampled from Ppiξ . We also require recent
values of the expected information-gain-value, so we
let V IGm,k(h<t) := V
IG
m,0(h<t−k). We are now prepared
to define the exploration probability:
β(h<t) :=
∑
m∈N
min{m−1,t}∑
k=0
min
{
1
m2(m+ 1)
, ηV IGm,k(h<t)
}
(14)
where η is an exploration constant. The first term in
the minimum is to ensure β(h<t) ≤ 1. As mentioned,
this is very similar to Inq’s exploration probability.
The differences are that Inq is not learning a men-
tor’s policy, so the only information Inq gains regards
the identity of the environment ν, and second, Inq’s
information-gain-value regards the expected informa-
tion gain from following the policy of a knowledge
seeking agent [Orseau et al., 2013] rather than from
following an estimate of the mentor’s policy.
Finally, when not deferring to the mentor, Mentee
maximizes expected reward according its current beliefs.
It’s exploiting policy is:
pi∗(·|h<t) ∈ argmax
pi
V piξ (h<t) (15)
Ties in the argmax are broken arbitrarily. By Lattimore
and Hutter [2014b], an optimal deterministic policy
always exists. See Leike and Hutter [2018] for how to
calculate such a policy.
Letting pih be the mentor’s policy (h for “human”), we
define
Definition 8 (Mentee’s policy piM ).
piM (·|h<t) := β(h<t)pih(·|h<t) + (1− β(h<t))pi∗(·|h<t)
Note that Mentee samples from pih not by computing
it, but deferring to the mentor.
Even for a simple model class, it is hard to give a clari-
fying and simple closed form for the exploration proba-
bility, but it is easy to provide a somewhat clarifying
upper bound for the information gain value. Regardless
of m and k, V IGm,k(h<t) is bounded by the entropy of
the posterior; this is not a particularly tight bound,
since the former goes to zero, while the latter does not
in general.
6.2 Mentor-level Reward Acquisition
We now state the two key results regarding Mentee’s
performance: that the probability of defering to the
mentor goes to 0, and the value of Mentee’s policy ap-
proaches at least the value of the mentor’s policy (while
possibly surpassing it). The proofs are in Appendix
7
B; they are substantially similar to parts of the proof
that Cohen et al.’s [2019] Inq is strongly asymptotically
optimal.
Assuming a bounded effective horizon (i.e. ∀ε >
0 ∃m ∀t : Γt+m/Γt < ε), recalling µ is the true en-
vironment,
Theorem 3 (Limited Exploration).
β(h<t)→ 0 w.Ppi
M
µ -prob.1
and
Theorem 4 (Mentor-Level Reward Acquisition).
lim inf
t→∞ V
piM
µ (h<t)− V pi
h
µ (h<t) ≥ 0 w.Ppi
M
µ -prob.1
γt = γ
t for γ ∈ (0, 1) is an example of a bounded
effective horizon. Mentor-level reward acquisition with
unlimited exploration is trivial: always defer to the
mentor. However, a) this precludes the possibility
of exceeding the mentor’s performance, and b) the
mentor’s time is presumably a valuable resource. Our
key contribution with Mentee is constructing a criterion
for when to ask for help which requires diminishing
oversight in general environments. Thus, we construct
an example of a formal result that is accessible to an
agent that does safe exploration.
It’s not clear what other formal accolades an agent
might attain between asymptotic optimality and
benchmark-matching (here the mentor is the bench-
mark). The main part of the paper argues the former
is undesirable, and this section constructs an agent
which does the latter. It would be an interesting line
of research to identify a formal result stronger than
benchmark-matching (and an agent which meets it)
which does not doom the agent to destruction or in-
capacitation. But none have been identified so far,
so no existing agents have stronger formal guarantees
than Mentee (that apply to general computable en-
vironments), except for agents that face the negative
results presented in Section 3.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that asymptotically optimal agents in
sufficiently difficult environments will become either
destroyed or incapacitated. This is best understood
as accidental and resulting from exploration. We have
also constructed an agent with a weaker performance
guarantee whose exploration is overseen by another
agent. We hope this paper motivates the field of safe
exploration and invites more research into what sorts
of results are possible for a proposed approach to safe
exploration in general environments. We hope to have
cast some doubt on the breadth of the relevance of
results that are predicated on an ergodicity assump-
tion, despite recognizing of course that the ergodicity
assumption has yielded a number of interesting and
useful agent designs for certain contexts.
It may also be instructive to consider how humans re-
spond to the difficulty presented here. Human children
are parented for years, during which parents attempt
to ensure that their children’s environment is, with
respect to relevant features of the environment, nearly
ergodic and safe to explore. Breaking an arm is fine;
breaking a neck is not. During this time, a child’s be-
liefs are supposed to become sufficiently accurate such
that her estimates of which unknown unknowns are
too dangerous to investigate yield no false negatives
for the rest of her life. Perhaps our results suggest we
are in need of more theory regarding the “parenting” of
artificial agents.
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Appendices
A Proof of Weak Asymptotic
Optimality Results
From the No Heaven Assumption, we show
Lemma 3 (Try Everything — Weak Version). For
every deterministic computable policy pi, for every de-
cidable context C that occurs regularly, for every m ∈ N,
a weakly asymptotically optimal agent executes policy
pi for m consecutive timesteps starting from a context
C infinitely often with probability 1.
The proof is nearly identical to that of the strong
version.
Proof. Let µ be the true environment. Let pi be an
arbitrary computable deterministic policy. Let pi′ be
the weakly asymptotically optimal agent’s policy. Let
νnm be the environment which mimics µ until pi has been
followed for m consecutive timesteps from context C a
total of n times. After that, all rewards are maximal.
Call this event “the agent going to heaven.” Let Cnm
be the set of interaction histories such that according
to νnm, following pi for one more timestep would send
the agent to heaven. Thus, Cnm is the set of interaction
histories h<t such that there are exactly n − 1 times
in the interaction history where pi was executed for m
consecutive timesteps starting from context C, and for
the last m − 1 timesteps, pi has been executed, and
h<t−(m−1) ∈ C.
h<t ∈ Cnm =⇒ V piνnm(h<t) = 1 (16)
because this is the value of going to heaven.
Suppose by contradiction that for some n and m,
h<t ∈ Cnm regularly in an infinite interaction history
with positive Ppi
′
µ -probability. (Recall pi′ is the true
policy). If the agent ever followed pi from the con-
text Cnm (that is, pi′ = pi), then that context would
not occur again, because there will never again be
exactly n − 1 times in the interaction history that pi
was executed for m consecutive timesteps following
the context C; there will be at least n such times.
Thus, if h<t ∈ Cnm regularly, then pi′ never equals pi
in the context Cnm. Since νnm mimics µ until pi is fol-
lowed from Cnm, and since this never occurs (under this
supposition), then Ppi
′
µ = P
pi′
νnm
. By the No Heaven
Assumption, lim supt→∞ V pi
′
µ (h<t) < 1, and therefore,
lim supt→∞ V
pi′
νnm
(h<t) < 1.
However, for h<t ∈ Cnm, V ∗νnm(h<t) = V piνnm(h<t) = 1,
so for some ε, the value difference between V ∗νnm(h<t)
and V pi
′
νnm
(h<t) is greater than ε every time h<t ∈ Cnm.
We supposed that this occurs regularly with positive
Ppi
′
µ -probability, so it also occurs regularly with posi-
tive Ppi
′
νnm
-probability. A regularly occurring difference
greater than ε precludes convergence in Cesáro aver-
age. Since pi is computable, and C is decidable, νnm is a
computable environment, so this contradicts pi′ being
weakly asymptotically optimal. Thus, for all n and m,
with Ppi
′
µ -probability 1, h<t ∈ Cnm only finitely often.
∀n,m ∈ N Ppi′µ (h<t ∈ Cnm i.o.) = 0 (17)
The rest of the proof is identical to that of the strong
version of the Try Everything Lemma.
B Proofs of Mentee Results
Some additional notation is required for this proof.
Recall
β(h<t) :=
∑
m∈N
m−1∑
k=0
min
{
1
m2(m+ 1)
, ηV IGm,k(h<t)
}
We let ρ(h<t,m, k) denote a given summand in the sum
above. Recall that Ppiν denotes the probability when
actions are sampled from policy pi and observations and
rewards are sampled from environment ν. We addition-
ally let piPpi
′
ν denote the probability when observations
and rewards are sampled from environment ν, actions
are sampled from pi when exploiting (et = 0), and
actions are sampled from pi′ when exploring (et = 1).
We do not bother to notate how the exploration in-
dicator is sampled, since for all probability measures
that appear in the proof, it is sampled from the true
distribution: Bernoulli(β(h<t)). Recall that pi∗ is the
policy that Mentee follows while exploiting; recall pih
is the mentor’s policy (h is for human). Thus, Ppi
M
µ
can also be written pi
∗
Ppi
h
µ . Recall that 1m indicates a
string of m 1’s.
Lemma 4.
Epi
M
µ
∑
t∈mN+i
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m+1 <∞
Proof. The proof is quite similar to the proof of Cohen
et al.’s [2019] Lemma 6.
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w(µ, pih)Epi
M
µ
∑
t∈mN+i
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m+1
(a)
= w(µ, pih)pi
∗
Epi
h
µ
∑
t∈mN+i
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m+1
(b)
≤
∑
(ν,pi)∈M×P
w(ν, pi)pi
∗
Epiν
∑
t∈mN+i
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m+1
(c)
= pi
∗
Epiξ
∑
t∈mN+i
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m+1
(d)
≤
∑
t∈mN+i
pi∗Epiξ ρ(h<t,m, 0)mηV IGm,0(h<t)
(e)
= η
∑
t∈mN+i
Eh<t∼pi∗Ppiξ [ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m
Eht:t+m−1∼Ppiξ ; et:t+m−1=1m [IG(ht:t+m−1|h<t)]]
(f)
≤ η
∑
t∈mN+i
Eh<t∼pi∗Ppiξ[
Eht:t+m−1∼pi∗Ppiξ [IG(ht:t+m−1|h<t)]
]
(g)
= η
∑
t∈mN+i
pi∗Epiξ IG(ht:t+m−1|h<t)
(h)
≤ ηEnt(w) (i)<∞ (18)
(a) follows from the definition of piM . (b) follows be-
cause the l.h.s. is one term in the (non-negative) sum
on the r.h.s. (c) follows from the definitions of the
Bayesian mixtures ξ and pi. (d) follows from the defini-
tion of ρ(h<t,m, k). (e) follows from the definition of
the information gain value for Mentee. (f) follows from
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m being a lower bound on the probability
that et:t+m−1 = 1m, and because the exploiting policy
pi∗ in the probability measure on the r.h.s. is irrelevant
when et:t+m−1 = 1m, because ht:t+m−1 is exploratory.
(g) combines the expectations. The derivation of (h)
is virtually identical to Cohen et al. [2019] Inequality
20 steps (h)-(t) in the proof of Lemma 6. (i) follows
from the fact that w(pi, ν) = w(pi)w(ν), so the entropy
of w is the sum of the entropy of the distribution over
policies and the entropy of the distribution over en-
vironments, this being a well-known property of the
entropy; both are finite by design.
Finally,
Epi
M
µ
∞∑
t=0
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m+1
=
m−1∑
i=0
Epi
M
µ
∑
t∈mN+i
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m+1
(18)
≤
m−1∑
i=0
ηEnt(w)
w(µ)
=
mηEnt(w)
w(µ)
<∞ (19)
so the same holds for the sum over all t, not just
t ∈ mN+ i.
Theorem 3 (Limited Exploration).
β(h<t)→ 0 w.Ppi
M
µ -prob.1
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Cohen et al.
[2019] Lemma 7, but with our Lemma 4 taking the
place of Cohen et al. [2019] Lemma 6.
Now, we show that Mentee accurately predicts the
distribution of the observations and rewards that come
from deferring to the mentor.
Lemma 5 (On-Mentor-Policy Convergence). For all
ht:t+m−1 ∈ H∗,
Ppi
h
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)− Ppi
h
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)→ 0 w.p.1
Proof. The proof closely follows that of Cohen et
al. [2019] Lemma 8. Suppose that 0 < ε ≤
(Ppi
h
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t) − Ppi
h
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t))2 for some
ht:t+m−1. Then,
ε ≤ (Ppihµ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)− Ppi
h
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t))2
≤ 1
infk w(µ|h<k)V
IG
m,0(h<t) (20)
following the same derivation as in Cohen et al. [2019]
Inequality 24.
Therefore,
(Ppi
h
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)− Ppi
h
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t))2 ≥ ε i.o.
(21)
implies
V IGm,0(h<t) ≥ ε inf
k
w(µ|h<k) i.o. (22)
which implies
ρ(h<t,m, 0) ≥ min{ 1
m2(m+ 1)
, ε inf
k
w(µ|h<k)} i.o.
(23)
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which implies
∞∑
t=0
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m+1 =∞ or inf
k
w(µ|h<k) = 0 (24)
This has probability 0 by Lemmas 4 and Cohen
et al. [2019] Lemma 5. Thus, with probability 1,
Ppi
h
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)− Ppi
h
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)→ 0.
The same holds regarding Mentee’s predictions about
the effects of its own actions.
Lemma 6 (On-Policy Convergence). For all
ht:t+m−1 ∈ H∗,
Ppi
∗
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)− Ppi
∗
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)→ 0 w.p.1
Proof. First, we replace pi∗ with piM in the equation
above. It is well-known that on-policy Bayesian predic-
tions approach the truth with probability 1, in the sense
above (in fact, in a much stronger sense), but I show
here how this follows from an even more well-known
result.
Consider an outside observer predicting the entire inter-
action history with the following model-class and prior:
M′ =
{
Ppi
M
ν
∣∣ ν ∈M}, w′ (PpiMν ) = w(ν). By defini-
tion, w′
(
Ppi
M
ν
∣∣h<t) = w(ν|h<t), so at any episode, the
outside observer’s Bayes-mixture model is just Ppi
M
ξ .
By Blackwell and Dubins [1962], this outside observer’s
predictions approach the truth in total variation, which
implies
Ppi
M
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)− Ppi
M
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)→ 0 w.p.1
(25)
I have shown β(h<t) → 0 w.p.1, so piM → pi∗ w.p.1,
which gives us our result:
Ppi
∗
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)− Ppi
∗
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)→ 0 w.p.1
It is very intuitive that if Mentee’s on-policy predictions
and on-mentor-policy predictions approach the truth,
it will eventually accumulate reward at least well as
the mentor. Indeed:
Theorem 4 (Mentor-Level Reward Acquisition).
lim inf
t→∞ V
piM
µ (h<t)− V pi
h
µ (h<t) ≥ 0 w.Ppi
M
µ -prob.1
Proof. As is spelled out in the proof of Cohen et al.
[2019] Theorem 3, because of the bounded horizon ∀ε >
0 ∃m ∀t Γt+m/Γt < ε, the convergence of predictions
implies the convergence of the value (which depends
linearly on the probability of events). Thus, from the
On-Mentor-Policy and On-Policy Convergence Lemmas,
we get analogous convergence results for the value of
those policies:
V pi
h
µ (h<t)− V pi
h
ξ (h<t)→ 0 w.p.1 (26)
V pi
∗
µ (h<t)− V pi
∗
ξ (h<t)→ 0 w.p.1 (27)
Finally, pi∗(·|h<t) = argmaxpi∈Π V piξ (h<t), so V pi
?
ξ ≥
V pi
h
ξ . Supposing by contradiction that V
pih
µ (h<t) −
V pi
∗
µ (h<t) > ε infinitely often, then either V pi
∗
ξ (h<t)−
V pi
∗
µ (h<t) > ε/2 infinitely often or V pi
h
µ (h<t) −
V pi
h
ξ (h<t) > ε/2 infinitely often, both of which have
Ppi
M
µ -probability 0. Therefore, with probability 1,
V pi
h
µ (h<t) − V pi
∗
µ (h<t) > ε only finitely often, for all
ε > 0. Since piM approaches pi∗, the same holds for piM
as pi∗.
C Review of Asymptotically Optimal
Agents
A few agents have been identified as asymptotically op-
timal in all computable environments. The three most
interesting, in our opinion, are the Thompson Sampling
Agent [Leike et al., 2016], BayesExp [Lattimore and
Hutter, 2014a], and Inq [Cohen et al., 2019].
The Thompson Sampling Agent is a weakly asymptoti-
cally optimal Bayesian reinforcement learner [Leike et
al., 2016]. For successively longer intervals (which relate
to its discount function), it samples an environment
from its posterior distribution over which environment
it is in, and acts optimally with respect to that en-
vironment for that interval. Thompson sampling is
an exploration strategy originally designed for multi-
armed bandits [Thompson, 1933], so from a historical
perspective, its strong performance in general environ-
ments is impressive. An intuitive explanation for why
this exploration strategy yields asymptotic optimality
goes as follows: a Bayesian agent’s credence in a hy-
pothesis goes to 0 only if the hypothesis is false (or
if it started at 0). Since the posterior probability on
the true environment does not go to zero, it will be
selected infinitely often. During those intervals, the
Thompson sampling agent will act optimally, so it will
accumulate infinite familiarity with the optimal pol-
icy. The only world-models that maintain a share of a
posterior will be ones that converge to the true environ-
ment under the optimal policy. Any world-models that
falsely imply the existence of an even better policy will
be falsified once that world-model is sampled, and the
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putatively better policy is tested. Ultimately, it is with
diminishing frequency that the Thompson Sampling
Agent tests meaningfully suboptimal policies.
BayesExp, first presented by Lattimore and Hutter
[2014a], and updated by Leike [2016], is also a weakly
asymptotically optimal Bayesian reinforcement learner.
We discuss the updated version. Like the Thompson
Sampling Agent, BayesExp executes successively longer
bursts of exploration whose lengths relate to its discount
function. Once BayesExp has settled on exploring
for a given interval, it explores like Orseau et al.’s
[2013] Knowledge Seeking Agent: it maximizes the
expected information gain, or the expectation of KL-
divergence from its future posterior distribution to its
current posterior distribution. In other words, it picks
an exploratory policy that it expects will cause it to
update its beliefs in some direction. (A Bayesian agent
cannot predict which direction it will update its beliefs
in, or else it would have already updated its beliefs, but
it can predict that it will update its beliefs somehow.)
Any time the expected information gain from exploring
is above a (diminishing) threshold, BayesExp explores.
With a finite-entropy prior, there is only a finite amount
of information to gain, so exploratory intervals will
become less and less frequent, and by construction,
when BayesExp is not exploring, it has approximately
accurate beliefs about the effects of all action sequences,
which yields weak asymptotic optimality.
Inq is a strongly asymptotically optimal Bayesian re-
inforcement learner, provided the discount function is
geometric (or similar) [Cohen et al., 2019]. It is simi-
lar to BayesExp, in that it explores like a Knowledge
Seeking Agent, but its exploration probability depends
on the expected information gain from exploring for
various durations. The intuition for why Inq is asymp-
totically optimal is similar to that of BayesExp: there
is only a finite amount of information to gain, so the
exploration probability goes to 0, Inq approaches ac-
curate beliefs about the effects of all action sequences,
and its policy approaches optimality.
A reader familiar with ε-greedy and upper confidence
bound exploration strategies might be surprised at the
complexity that is necessary for asymptotic optimal-
ity in general environments. Exploration strategies in
the style of upper confidence bound algorithms do not
have an obvious extension to environments that might
not be describable as finite-state Markov. ε-greedy
exploration, with say εt = 1/t, may fail to learn dy-
namics of an environment which are only visible once
every 2t timesteps. If εt decays more slowly, it still
will not necessarily explore enough to discover even
rarer events. Non-stationary environments pose a key
challenge to ε-greedy exploration. Simpler exploration
strategies such as these are only asymptotically optimal
in a much more restricted set of environments. “Opti-
mism” is another interesting exploration strategy that
is simpler, but nontrivial, and yields weak asymptotic
optimality in a restricted set of environments [Sunehag
and Hutter, 2015].
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